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Abstract 
The deadlock in the WTO Doha Round has been accompanied by an increased focus on the 
negotiation of preferential trade agreements, including so-called ‘mega-regionals’. This paper 
discusses possible implications for—and possible responses by—excluded countries that have little 
prospects of participating in most of the mega-regionals. A number of complementary avenues are 
identified through which such countries might attenuate the potential downsides of preferential trade 
liberalization among large countries, as well some proposals that would expand the scope to pursue 
cooperation on regulatory policies in the WTO as opposed to PTAs. 
Keywords 
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 1 
Introduction* 
There has been sustained interest by developing and transition economies in the WTO, reflected both 
in the number of countries that have joined since its formation (over 30) and the 20 or so nations that 
are in the process of negotiating accession, and in their very active engagement and increasing 
influence in the day-to-day operations of the WTO, including the Doha Round talks.
1
 The fact that the 
first round of multilateral trade negotiations launched under WTO auspices in 2001 was called the 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA) is one sign of the rising influence of developing countries in the 
WTO. The choice of name reflected a view held by many countries that it was necessary to address a 
perceived ‘development deficit’ in the disciplines of the institution and that more needed to be done to 
recognize and address the capacity constraints that reduced the benefits of market access opportunities 
and WTO agreements (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009).  
Key objectives for many low-income countries in the DDA included enhancing the effectiveness of 
provisions calling for differential and more favorable treatment of developing economies; improving 
preferential (non-reciprocal) access to major markets and expanding assistance to improve trade 
capacity; and ‘rebalancing’ the rules of the WTO by revisiting provisions and exceptions permitting 
high-income countries to use policies that were detrimental to developing country exports. Examples 
include tariff escalation, agricultural subsidy policies, and barriers to the cross-border movement of 
natural persons providing services. Results were achieved on the preferential market access and the aid 
elements of this agenda. Milestones included the Integrated Framework for Trade-related Assistance 
for Least Developed Countries, created at the Singapore ministerial meeting in 1997; improvements in 
preferential access to markets (such as the EU’s Everything But Arms program and the US African 
Growth and Opportunity Act), and the launch of the ‘duty-free, quota-free’ market access initiative for 
LDCs and the Aid for Trade initiative at the 2005 WTO Ministerial meeting in Hong Kong. But no 
progress was made in redefining the core rules of the WTO. As is well known, it proved impossible to 
get an agreement on a set of new reciprocal market access commitments and policy disciplines 
affecting trade in agricultural products, manufactures or services.  
There has been much discussion and analysis of the reasons for the deadlock in the DDA. One 
important factor has been the active participation and engagement of developing countries and their 
insistence that issues that are important to them are addressed. Wolfe (2013) among others stresses 
changes in the structure of the world economy, and in particular the explosive growth of China, as a 
major reason the DDA agenda, as conceived in 2001 and restructured in 2003, became increasingly 
less relevant as time passed. A basic cause of the breakdown in the talks was the difference in what 
OECD countries, in particular the US, wanted to obtain from the large emerging markets, especially 
Brazil, China, and India (BCI), and what these countries were willing to offer and were looking for in 
return. The upshot is that the issues that were the focus of negotiation were not rich enough to allow a 
deal to be struck.
2
 This does not imply that the potential economic gains from implementing what was 
                                                     
*
 I am grateful to three anonymous referees, Axel Dreher, Petros Mavroidis, Marcelo Olarreaga, Robert Wolfe and 
participants in conferences and seminars at the European University Institute, Seoul National University, Stanford 
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1
 Membership in the WTO has expanded steadily since it was established in 1995, standing at 160 as of December 2013, 
following the expected accession of Yemen at the December ministerial in Bali. 
2
 For example, India wants better access to services markets, but seeks to expand its ability to support domestic agricultural 
production. Brazil wants more liberalization of agricultural trade in OECD countries, including bio-fuels, but also wants 
to protect industrial activity from import competition. For much of the DDA, China took the position that it already made 
major commitments as part of its 2001 WTO accession. For most large firms in the OECD agriculture does not matter, 
while further liberalization of manufactures is important for only a limited number of industries given that average tariffs 
in major markets are low and firms appear to perceive the probability of governments raising tariffs to be low. While high 
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on the table are trivial – see e.g., Hoekman, Martin and Mattoo (2010) and Laborde, Martin and van 
der Mensbrugghe (2011). But the potential gains did not generate enough political support to allow a 
deal to be concluded; the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) was not perceived to be 
particularly bad. Indeed, it would appear from the actions taken by the US and the EU towards the end 
of the 2000s that better alternatives existed in the form of trade agreements that excluded BCI. 
In parallel to the DDA deadlock, the US and EU turned towards the negotiation of new preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs) – the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) and a Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) are major examples that are 
all under negotiation at the time of writing. Time will tell whether these efforts will succeed in going 
significantly beyond what is covered by the WTO. But with the majors “going regional” the WTO is 
unlikely to be forum for negotiating new policy disciplines in the next few years. These developments 
raise numerous questions regarding the possible consequences for developing (and other) countries 
that are either excluded or are “price takers” in the mega-regionals. The WTO as a multilateral 
institution is particularly important to small countries that do not have market power. A breakdown in 
the ability of the WTO to extend the reach of disciplines to new policy areas that generate negative 
spillovers may impact most detrimentally on the 100+ countries that are not included in the mega-
regionals. While there are strong economic forces that are likely to keep markets open – e.g., the 
increasing role of global value chains and international production networks – rules of origin, 
regulatory convergence and mutual recognition among mega PTA members may create incentives for 
companies to locate in a bloc, or to source from firms located within a bloc. 
This paper discusses possible responses that could be pursued in the WTO by countries that are not 
part of the new PTAs or that would prefer to see more done at the multilateral level to address the 
negative spillover effects of national policies or PTA-based initiatives. Section 1 starts with a bird’s 
eye view of some salient stylized facts that provide background and context. Section 2 discusses 
implications of these trends and changes in the trade environment. Section 3 presents a number of 
options that could be pursued by WTO members to attenuate the potential downsides of preferential 
trade liberalization among large countries, as well some proposals that would focus attention on 
regulatory policies in the WTO and prepare the ground for cooperation in areas that are not (yet) on 
the multilateral trade agenda. Section 4 concludes. 
1. Some Stylized Facts and Trends post-2001 
High growth in developing countries, especially China. One of the distinctive features of the post 
Second World War period has been the steady and sustained increase in international commerce. With 
the exception of a few episodes when the world went into recession, global trade has grown more 
rapidly than output year in, year out. The volume of trade increased 27-fold between 1950 and 2008, 
three times more than the growth in global GDP. The value of global trade in goods and services 
passed the US$20 trillion mark in 2011 (WTO, 2012) or 59 percent of global GDP, up from 39 percent 
of GDP in 1990.
3
 This increase in trade was accompanied by rising real per capita incomes around the 
globe. Notwithstanding the 2008 global financial crisis (which led to a temporary collapse in global 
trade), for many developing countries economic growth rates in the period after the launch of the DDA 
were a multiple of those attained in the 1980s and 1990s (Table 1).  
  
(Contd.)                                                                  
peak tariffs remain for some products, the tariff agenda was not enough to mobilize a critical mass of OECD firms. 
Subjects that might do so – such as the prospect of significant liberalization of services trade – were never the focus of 
serious talks in the DDA. Services were taken up outside the WTO in 2012 with the launch of negotiations among a 
smaller group of countries on a Trade in Services Agreement (TISA). See Wolfe (2013) for a detailed discussion. 
3
 Trade openness ratios were calculated from the World Bank Global Economic Prospects database.  
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Table 1. Average annual growth rate of per capita GDP (constant 2005 US $) 
Developing country groups 1982-2012 2001-2012 
East Asia & Pacific 7.2% 7.5% 
Europe & Central Asia 1.8% 3.8% 
High-income countries 1.8% 1.0% 
Latin America & Caribbean 1.1% 1.9% 
Least Developed Countries 1.5% 3.3% 
Middle East & North Africa 1.5% 2.5% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.4% 1.9% 
South Asia 4.0% 4.9% 
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank, World Development Indicators database. 
The basic drivers of the boom in trade were a steep fall in trade costs, the result of technological 
change and major policy reforms, especially the adoption of outward- (export-) oriented policies. 
Average tariffs that were in the 20-30 percent range in 1950 (WTO, 2007), complemented by a 
plethora of nontariff barriers that were often more binding (including quantitative restrictions and 
exchange controls). Today the average tariff equivalent for merchandise trade has fallen to the 5-10 
percent range (Kee et al., 2009). Effective tariffs for firms are often much lower than MFN rates as a 
result of free trade agreements and customs regimes that do not impose tariffs on imported inputs that 
are used to produce exports. China undertook a massive trade and investment liberalization program 
pre- and post-WTO accession (China joined the WTO in 2001), with applied tariffs declining to less 
than 7 percent today; all tariffs bound in the WTO at 9.8 percent on average and numerous services 
industries opened to foreign competition (Sally and Sen, 2011). Similarly, the average applied MFN 
tariff in India is now around 6 percent. 
In 2010 China became the world’s largest exporter in gross value terms, with a 10.4 percent share 
of global merchandise exports (WTO, 2013). The US remains the world’s largest importer, followed 
by China. If the EU-27 is considered as a bloc (and netting out intra-EU trade), the EU is the largest 
exporter (15%), followed by China (13%) and the US (11%). These three entities are also the largest 
importers, accounting for 45 percent of global merchandise imports. Overall, including trade in both 
goods and services, China exports five times more than India.
4
 Much of China’s trade growth occurred 
in the 2000s. When it joined the WTO, China accounted for 3.7 percent of global trade. This almost 
doubled to reach 6.7 percentage points at the end of the decade.  
Growth in ‘vertical specialization’ and ‘supply chain trade’. Much of world trade now comprises 
intra-industry trade and trade in intermediate inputs. This reflects a process of ever finer specialization 
by firms, made feasible by the reduction in trade and communications costs and the ability to invest in 
foreign markets. Firms can lower total costs by splintering the production process across multiple 
countries. One result is that imports make up an increasing share of the total value added embodied in 
products. The expansion in supply chain trade has been supported by cross-border movement of 
capital and knowhow. The global value of the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) rose more than 
6-fold between 1990 and 2008, substantially faster than the growth in trade, which increased ‘only’ 3.5 
times over the same period. ). The value of local sales by foreign-owned firms was some US$26 
trillion in 2012, as compared to $18 trillion for world merchandise trade. A network of some 3,000 
bilateral investment agreements (BITs) helped to provide a framework to support FDI (UNCTAD, 
2013). One reflection of the growth in supply chain trade is that the share of manufactures in total 
exports of developing countries has increased from just 30 percent in 1980 to over 70 percent today. 
                                                     
4
 Brazil and India are much smaller players in global commerce, ranking 22nd and 20th respectively in terms of merchandise 
trade volumes in 2010. India is a bigger player in trade in services, ranking 5th for both exports and imports, but still 
behind China, which ranks 3rd after the EU and the US. 
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Much of this trade is intra-industry and intra-regional – e.g., about half of all East Asian exports of 
manufactures go to other East Asian economies, often as part of a supply chain (Baldwin, 2012).  
Diverging performance across countries. There is substantial variation across countries in trade 
growth and diversification. Many countries have not seen the shift towards intra-industry trade, 
vertical specialization and participation in international supply chains that has been a driver of trade 
growth in East Asia, Mexico, Turkey, or Central and Eastern Europe. Sub-Saharan African countries 
in particular remain heavily dependent on natural resources and agricultural products. And although 
there has been a sea change in trade policy everywhere, the poorest countries often tend to have higher 
barriers and trade costs, in part because a lack of “connectivity”, reflecting weaknesses in 
infrastructure. Since 2001, trade costs have fallen more in richer nations than in poor ones (Arvis et al. 
2013). Trade costs for services are more than double those that apply to goods (Miroudot and 
Shepherd, 2012). This reduces the payoffs to preferential access programs and more generally the 
value of market access negotiations—the binding constraint is often the domestic business climate as 
opposed to import protection at home or abroad. 
2. Implications for international trade policy cooperation 
These trends and stylized facts help explain the deadlock in the WTO on the DDA. While a variety of 
factors explain the difficulty in concluding the DDA and the shift towards preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs), two that arguably are particularly pertinent are (i) the increasing heterogeneity 
across developing countries, with a number of large economies growing rapidly and attaining middle-
income county status; and (ii) an increasingly perceived need to address spillovers created by policies 
that were not on the table in the DDA but that are important for international business decisions and 
operations.  
High developing country growth rates during the 2001-2008 period reduced incentives to agree to 
lower tariff bindings—after all, trade was booming. But sustained high growth in large developing 
countries also implied that these economies had become more important markets and that better 
market access was of greater interest to exporters around the world. Relatively high tariffs in 
conjunction with high real growth in per capita income terms made OECD member countries less 
inclined to accept ‘less than full reciprocity’ in negotiations. Instead they insisted on significant 
liberalization by the large emerging markets. These countries were unwilling to do so absent greater 
concessions from the demandeurs, which they in turn would not consider. Many of the poorest 
countries were focused on obtaining concessions in areas that are of key export interest to them – often 
agricultural – and more generally improving access to markets on a preferential basis. Movement on 
policies distorting agricultural markets that were of most interest to LDCs, most notably cotton in the 
case of West Africa, proved impossible given the strength of the relevant domestic lobbies in rich 
countries. 
While the deadlock in the DDA illustrates that tariffs still matter, the increasing vertical 
specialization of production and trade has changed the political economy of trade policy by reducing 
the effectiveness of import protection as a form of industrial policy. Taxing inputs implies an indirect 
tax on exports and thus impedes the ability of firms to be competitive in supply chain trade (Baldwin, 
2012; Gawande et al. 2013). This helps to understand why there has been a relative increase in the use 
measures that restrict exports of natural resources that are upstream inputs into global value chains. 
This may act as a subsidy, making domestic processors and the chains they connect to more 
competitive. Governments appear to be making increasing use of subsidy-like policies that aim to 
reduce costs for firms located in their jurisdictions.
5
 These other types of trade-distorting policies were 
not on the table in the DDA (see e.g., Hoekman, Mattoo and Martin, 2010).  
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 See the Global Trade Alert database at http://www.globaltradealert.org/. 
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More generally, the changing structure of global trade has led to a greater focus on the effects of 
policies on trade costs. Rather than provide firms with subsidies it is likely to be more effective and 
efficient to reduce costs directly. Much of this is a domestic agenda—e.g., improving transport and 
telecommunications infrastructure and related services. But often trade costs will in part be created as 
a result of explicit discrimination against foreign providers – e.g., a ban on foreign trucks or the use of 
financial services such as insurance – or, more frequently, differences across countries in regulatory 
standards for goods and services and associated certification requirements and processes. The fact that 
firms have to adjust products to the norms required in each jurisdiction segments markets, raises costs 
and thus consumer prices, and may imply that some varieties simply are not available in some 
markets, further reducing consumer welfare. 
Both high-income and developing countries have been very active in negotiating PTAs, and there 
has been extensive research on the implications of this trend for the countries involved, non-members 
and the trading system.
6
 Most PTAs negotiated since the mid -1990s go beyond the WTO in terms of 
coverage. One measure of this additionality is the sectoral coverage of services. Van der Marel and 
Miroudot (2012) document that the average number of sectors subject to commitments in PTAs 
substantially exceed commitments in the GATS for the countries involved. However, the substantive 
disciplines (rules) that are included in many PTAs are often similar to those in the GATS, i.e., the 
depth of the associated commitments often does not go much beyond what PTA members committed 
to under the WTO (Fink and Jansen, 2009). In areas where there are no WTO disciplines, there often 
tends not to be rules in PTAs either—examples are safeguard provisions, rules on subsidies and 
domestic regulation (Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir, 2010). Two important exceptions are foreign direct 
investment and public procurement, policy areas that are not covered by general WTO disciplines. 
This situation may well change as a result of the shift by the US and the EU towards negotiation of 
PTAs with each other and other large high-income countries such as Japan. Four major examples at 
the time of writing are the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP).
7
 TTIP is a bilateral EU-US initiative, although in practice it will be 
quadrilateral given that Mexico and Canada are part of the NAFTA and both countries also have 
bilateral trade agreements with the EU. Developing countries are participating in the RCEP, TPP and 
the TISA talks, but the first two of these are regional arrangements and thus by design exclude the 
majority of developing countries, while the TISA is limited to a group of “really good friends of 
services” which again does not include the majority of developing nations.  
Countries that are participating in the RCEP, TPP and TISA include economies that have actively 
pursued a ‘global integration’ strategy, liberalizing trade, seeking inward FDI and promoting 
participation by local firms in international supply networks. But many ‘global integrators’ are 
excluded from the RCEP and TPP negotiations as a result of geography (they are not Pacific 
countries); because they were not invited or because they decided not to participate. A large number of 
developing countries, including the poorest ones (the LDCs), have remained outside these new 
initiatives and many would not want to be involved even if they were able to (as is the case with TISA, 
which in principle is open to any country).
8
 Instead, many of the countries in this set emphasize the 
                                                     
6
 Freund and Ornelas (2010) survey recent empirical research on the relationship between PTAs and the WTO. 
7
 At the time of writing (November 2013), RCEP involves 16 countries: the 10 members of ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and six countries with which 
ASEAN has a free trade agreement (Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand). The TISA includes 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong China, Iceland, Israel, Japan, the Republic 
of Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Pakistan, Peru, Switzerland, Turkey and the US. The TPP 
spans Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the US and Vietnam. 
8
 In practice the ability to participate is conditional in the sense that countries that did not join the talks early on will find it 
more difficult to be accepted in the ongoing negotiations on the substance of an agreement—once the talks have 
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need for concluding the DDA, continued application of the ‘less than full reciprocity’ principle, and 
the need to safeguard ‘policy space’ to be able to intervene in trade.9  
Non-members may lose from the shift to mega-regionals and away from the WTO for new rule-
making by a subset of the major traders. For these countries the DDA deadlock and the pivot by the 
US and EU towards mega-regional initiatives means no multilateral progress on market access and 
new rules in areas that are of importance to them.
10
 A challenge for the 100+ countries that are 
excluded or not participating in the current mega-regionals is to identify actions to reduce potential 
downsides and/or to benefit from these initiatives. This is an important question not just for all the 
countries in Africa, the Middle East, Central and South Asia that will never be part of the TPP or 
TTIP. It is also very relevant for those countries in Latin America and East Asia that could be but are 
not part of the TPP discussions. These include not just China, but also six ASEAN member countries, 
including Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. And it applies to all developing countries when it 
comes to the TTIP and the large number of countries that decided to stay out of the TISA talks.  
Classic trade diversion costs generated by preferential removal of tariffs under TTP or the TTIP are 
likely to be limited because average tariffs in most of the countries participating in these initiatives are 
low.
11
 The same may be true of a TISA given the likelihood that regulatory changes will be applied on 
a nondiscriminatory basis because in practice it is difficult to apply regulatory policies on a 
discriminatory basis. However, this does not apply in areas where there are tariff peaks. More 
generally, there is potential for both de jure and de facto discrimination following agreement to reduce 
the market segmenting effects of differences in regulatory policies. How significant this will be will 
depend on whether third country firms will be able to benefit from access to the larger market created 
by the PTA by demonstrating that their products or services comply with the relevant regulatory 
standards. In practice it may be difficult to exclude third-country firms from benefiting from initiatives 
that lower the fixed costs of enforcement of regulation in member countries.
12
 But such exclusion can 
easily occur if third countries do not have access to recognized certification systems and therefore 
have to continue to incur market-specific conformity assessment and inspection costs.  
One potential response by excluded nations is to seek to join the mega-regionals. As mentioned, for 
many if not most countries that will not be possible given the regional nature of these PTAs.
13
 Another 
response is to pursue PTAs in turn—with Brazil, China, India, and other large developing economies 
such as Indonesia and Turkey. This can help generate greater trade with countries that are likely to 
continue growing more rapidly than the EU and US, and where traditional barriers to trade are 
substantially higher. If such PTAs result in meaningful preferential liberalization, the associated trade 
diversion could become an incentive for a renewed effort to conclude a multilateral deal at the WTO, 
in part by eroding the power of the interest groups in BCI that currently resist market opening on a 
MFN basis. However, to date the PTAs involving BCI have tended to be shallow, with substantial 
(Contd.)                                                                  
advanced and the outlines of an agreement agreed among participants, new countries will likely have to wait until the 
‘original’ TISA countries have finalized an agreement and then negotiate their accession. 
9
 As mentioned in the Introduction this negotiating strategy has had some positive results in addressing some of the 
perceived ‘development deficit’ that motivated the design of the DDA, including more duty-free, quota-free (DFQF) 
access, the Aid for Trade (AFT) initiative and the Enhanced Integrated Framework for the LDCs. See Hoekman (2012). 
10
 Examples are tariff escalation or the elimination of support for cotton production in OECD nations. As the latter have 
made clear that any deal on agricultural policies or tariffs will need to be balanced by market access concessions by BCI, 
there is little that small developing nations such as the cotton-4 (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali) can do beyond 
advocacy.  
11
 In part such additional costs will be low because the US has PTAs with most of the other TPP countries.  
12
 The literature investigating the effects of regional harmonization of standards has found that this may benefit excluded 
countries, but that this is conditional on the capacity to satisfy the norms and mechanisms that are adopted by a PTA. See 
e.g., Chen and Mattoo (2008) and Shepherd (2007).  
13
 TISA is an exception. 
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exceptions and exclusions to safeguard sensitive products and industries and no disciplines on the use 
of industrial policy-related instruments and regulatory regimes.  
Given their (pro-claimed) goal to be high-quality, “21st century” agreements that address the 
regulatory causes of market segmentation and reduce the cost-raising effects of domestic policies, 
another response is to focus resources on understanding what members of the mega-regionals actually 
do and to learn from the initiatives that are pursued. Achieving the objectives that the countries 
participating in the new PTAs have set themselves will not be straightforward. There will be much to 
be learned from the experience obtained in implementing these PTAs.  
Another possible response is to consider what can be done to reduce the incentive to use the PTA 
route for countries that want to go beyond existing WTO disciplines, and to encourage greater use of 
the WTO to discuss and agree on measures to reduce regulatory trade costs. Greater willingness to 
support cooperation on regulatory matters inside the WTO by subsets of the membership could reduce 
the proliferation of PTAs given that one motivation for pursuing the PTA track is to deal with policy 
matters that are not on the table in the WTO. Currently PTAs are regarded by policymakers and 
analysts as the default option for the pursuit of cooperation on a policy matter if no consensus can be 
found in the WTO. Moving beyond this dichotomy by pursuing alternative options that already exist 
or could easily be created in the context of the WTO could help reduce the fragmentation of the 
trading system over time and do more to assist all WTO members to learn and benefit from initiatives 
and experimentation that is pursued among smaller groups of members. 
What follows presents four proposals that are examples of options that could be pursued in the 
WTO without major institutional changes: (1) using WTO mechanisms to assess the (spillover) 
impacts of policies and enhance understanding of how (differences in) regulatory regimes affect 
competitiveness; (2) increasing the transparency of what is done in PTAs and identifying ‘good 
practices’ that could be pursued by non-members as well; (3) extending the benefits of PTA provisions 
to LDCs; and (4) making greater use of opportunities for plurilateral agreements and cooperation 
under the umbrella of the WTO.
14
  
3. Some Specific Proposals 
3.1. Addressing policy spillovers more effectively: WTO as convener and focal point 
As mentioned, the agenda for international trade cooperation increasingly concerns the effects of 
regulatory policies that generate negative pecuniary spillovers for trade and investment. Frequently, a 
multiplicity of regulatory norms and related enforcement requirements that are imposed independently 
by different government agencies generate excess costs for firms—in the sense that costs of 
compliance are greater than what is necessary to attain the underlying social or economic objectives. 
Many of these regulatory policies apply equally to local and foreign firms and products, but even if 
they do they will usually increase trade costs more for foreign than for domestic suppliers simply 
because regulations differ across countries and/or because foreign firms are subject to a multiplicity of 
requirements that are redundant (duplicative). More generally, regulatory policies may needlessly raise 
costs across the board – for domestic and foreign firms – and thus the price of goods and services for 
firms and households.  
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 The options discussed in what follows are process-oriented as opposed to substantive in the sense that the focus is not on 
specific policy areas and issues that arguably should be priorities for WTO members to address. There are many papers 
that do the latter – see e.g., Baldwin (2012) and Mattoo and Subramanian (2009). Rather than enumerating my own list of 
issue areas, the aim of the next section is to focus attention on process and approaches that WTO members could use to 
help them identify areas for potential cooperation, opportunities to make existing agreements more effective and to 
improve the common understanding of initiatives that are pursued outside the WTO.  
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Given that regulation and domestic policies are increasingly the source of market segmentation, 
some degree of positive integration (agreement on common rules or mutual recognition) may be 
needed to achieve joint increases in economic welfare (e.g., Antras and Staiger, 2012). Determining 
what would do so is not straightforward. Regulatory measures often cannot simply be abolished or 
their impacts on trade reduced by x percent as can be done for tariffs or taxes. In principle they fulfill a 
specific social or economic purpose, even if the effect is to restrict trade. Addressing the trade effects 
of regulation requires first an understanding at the national level of the effects of prevailing policies 
and the likely impacts of alternative welfare-enhancing reforms. Many reforms will not require actions 
by other governments (trading partners), but international agreements may help mobilize political 
attention to an issue and overcome resistance by vested interests. International cooperation may also 
help governments identify beneficial reforms. But such cooperation may not be very effective if it is 
pursued through reciprocal exchanges of policy commitments – the standard modality of trade 
negotiations – because parties generally will be unwilling to change policies if they believe these to be 
effective. Building a better understanding of the status quo and its impacts, knowledge of the 
approaches and processes used in different jurisdictions, and potential gains from reforms may be a 
necessary condition for cooperation on regulatory matters.  
The WTO is geared towards the negotiation of enforceable commitments. This is its primary 
strength: binding disciplines reduce uncertainty for traders who know that the dispute settlement 
mechanism can be used to ensure that governments live up to what they sign on to. A precondition for 
agreement on binding international rules is a shared recognition that the negative spillovers associated 
with a policy (set of policies) are significant and that a proposed set of (enforceable) disciplines will 
result in greater efficiency (lower costs). At present there is no such recognition among the WTO 
membership at large when it comes to policy areas that can generate market segmentation, raise costs, 
impede innovation or otherwise give rise to negative spillovers. This suggests a need to work towards 
putting in place the preconditions for stronger forms of international cooperation—by improving the 
transparency of applied policies; supporting independent analysis of the effects of policies; and 
establishing mechanisms through which governments can consult and exchange information. 
Hoekman and Mattoo (2013) suggest the formation of “knowledge platforms” that would bring 
together different government agencies, regulators and stakeholders to assess/analyze the impacts of 
prevailing policy regimes and act as a focal point for agreement on beneficial reforms. Such platforms 
would facilitate knowledge exchange and build on existing networks of regulators and industry 
associations. In the case of low-income countries they would also provide a vehicle to connect with 
the donor community and development agencies that can provide support for implementation of 
reforms.  
The WTO, as do other trade agreements, tends to take a “silo approach”, addressing policy areas in 
isolation.
15
 This is reflected in the structure of the organization—three different multilateral 
agreements, with a plethora of policy instrument- or area-specific committees that are charged with 
overseeing implementation of the agreements, and a secretariat that is organized into divisions that are 
“mapped” to the different agreements. For businesses this policy-specific focus may reduce the 
relevance of WTO agreements in terms of impacts in lowering trade costs. From the perspective of 
international supply chains and production networks a variety of policies may matter. The marginal 
effect of disciplining or changing one policy instrument may be reduced if the cost-raising effects of 
others are not addressed in parallel (Hoekman, 2013). Figuring out what policies have the greatest 
impact on trade and investment, and which policy areas ideally need to be considered jointly, requires 
substantial preparatory work.  
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 This observation pertains to the implementation of agreements, not necessarily to their negotiation. A premise of the 
“single undertaking” approach in WTO negotiations is that a package deal that involves a number of policy areas and 
thus associated issue linkages will ensure that a Pareto-improving outcome. See e.g., Sebenius (1983) and Conconi and 
Perroni (2002). 
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No mechanism exists in the WTO that provides a “knowledge platform” function or that is 
designed to discuss complementary sets of policies and identify how they interact to impact on trade 
costs and investment location decisions. Given the complexity of today’s organization of global trade 
and investment flows this may explain why business appears to less engaged in and supportive of the 
WTO than was the case during the Uruguay Round. Creating platforms that allow (encourage) looking 
across the various policy silos that all have an impact on supply chain trade, that help identify what 
policy areas should be prioritized and whether there are important “gaps” in the existing coverage of 
WTO agreements would at a minimum be informative. But better knowledge may also support 
unilateral action by governments seeking to improve the competitiveness of firms located in their 
jurisdictions and, over time, such engagement could prepare the ground for new agreements or the 
deepening of existing disciplines.  
Business needs to be an integral part of any cross-cutting transparency and learning processes in a 
way that goes beyond “consultations” and “dialogue”. One reason is that the business community can 
provide the data that are needed for objective assessments of the impacts of policies and for measuring 
the progress over time in reducing the negative trade and investment effects of regulatory policies. A 
constraint in this connection is that business may be hesitant to make relevant data publicly available 
for fear of adverse reactions by government agencies or worries about revealing useful information to 
competitors. Conversely, governments may discount information provided by business because of 
perceptions that firms will seek to remove any policies that raise their costs even if the underlying 
measures are implemented efficiently by the administrative bodies responsible for enforcement of 
policy. The WTO secretariat could play a role in addressing these concerns by acting as an objective 
intermediary and depository of data provided by business, and assuring WTO members that these are 
relevant and appropriate in measuring and assessing the impacts of regulatory policies.
16 
Hoekman (2013) suggests one option to move towards operationalizing greater engagement with 
business on trade and investment-related policies: establishing “supply chain councils” that would 
focus on a selected number of specific production networks. These could be limited to a purely 
informational mandate, tasked to identify the most binding regulatory policy constraints that impact 
negatively on supply chain trade (SCT), including the effects of policy-induced uncertainty that 
generate a need to hold excess inventory and engage in other forms of costly “self-insurance.” It 
would be impossible to establish councils for all the major types of international production networks 
given the enormous heterogeneity that prevails in the market place. But identifying a number of 
‘representative’ supply chains/networks for a set of products that are important for a broad cross-
section of the WTO membership should be feasible and help to improve the understanding of 
policymakers how a broad variety of regulatory policies impact on the operation of the chosen chains 
and networks.  
The process of “mapping” supply chain trade costs and inefficiencies to regulatory policies will 
require inputs from both business and the research community. Supply chain managers within firms 
may not understand or be interested in determining the various sources of costs and uncertainty, 
implying a need for collaboration with analysts. One can imagine various outputs of such a process. 
One could be a proposed action plan to address the policy-based sources of excessive SCT costs. 
Another output could be to identify performance indicators and quantitative baselines that would help 
both to motivate the need to pursue reforms and allow a determination of whether progress is made 
over time to reduce trade costs. Examples might include the time it takes for consignments to satisfy 
all border management processes, or the share of transactions that are physically inspected, or the 
variance in the average time that is required for regulatory approval to be obtained. One reason why 
metrics matter is because of the scope for policies to substitute for each other—removing one source 
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 Such a role is played by other international organizations for other types of data – e.g., the ICC for data on trade finance 
and the World Bank for firm- and household level survey data. 
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of redundant or duplicative regulatory cost may not have an effect if other policies continue to impose 
excess costs.  
An important question for governments in determining whether to go down this track is to 
determine if the WTO is the best place to do it. Are WTO members willing to engage with the 
business community on trade and trade-related regulatory policies? Would other fora be more 
appropriate? Clearly the type of exercise that is being suggested can be pursued by other 
organizations. Indeed, to some extent organizations like the World Bank undertake similar types of 
activities. Thus, any assessment of national trade competitiveness will do much of what is being 
proposed here. Analysis of the business environment and investment climate is regularly undertaken 
by the World Bank for its clients or by the OECD for its members. This suggests a need for bringing 
these organizations into the envisaged process. This has value given that the national officials that 
work with these organizations are often not the ones responsible for trade policy, and even if trade 
officials are aware of the diagnostics and follow-on activities, the national delegations in Geneva often 
will not be. Conversely, the teams that undertake the diagnostics and policy analysis for the World 
Bank, OECD or regional development banks often will not consider the implications of their findings 
for design and operation of the WTO. Whether policies or SCT frictions that are identified are covered 
by the WTO may not be a matter of interest, even though this would be relevant information for WTO 
delegations. The same is true as regards the interactions between policy areas that impact on trade 
costs. A regulatory regime for road trucking that significantly reduces competition and the average 
quality of services may nullify much of the expected reductions in trade costs from an effort to reduce 
customs clearance times. There has been much talk about policy coherence – doing more in the WTO 
to bring in the methodologies and approaches used to assess trade competitiveness could be one way 
of enhancing coherence.  
While there is much that other organizations can bring to the WTO in terms of assessments of 
policies and regulatory regimes and their impact on investment incentives, the products and activities 
that they undertake are not a substitute for the proposed supply chain approach. The latter differs in 
important ways from the modus operandi of institutions such as the World Bank. One difference is 
that by their nature a supply chain approach to analysis must be multi-country. The competitiveness 
diagnostics that are done by the World Bank and other development institutions are generally country-
specific. Supply chains are by nature multi-country, and the assessments of SCT frictions that will 
emerge from the proposed process will focus on policies in a number of countries. This characteristic 
provides one rationale for making this a WTO-centered process. Another rationale is that one function 
of the WTO is to address international pecuniary spillovers. Policies of trading partners that affect 
access to export markets or the availability and cost of imported inputs such as natural resources are 
generally taken as given in competitiveness diagnostic assessments. Bringing a SCT focus to the WTO 
would allow the effects of all policies along the supply chain to be identified and discussed and 
thereby become a potential focal point for actions aimed at internalizing some of the externalities that 
are identified.  
How would such a supply chain approach be implemented? One locus within the WTO for moving 
in the proposed direction is the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. However, this has the same feature 
as World Bank and other organizations’ analyses of policies in that the focus is country-specific (or 
customs union-specific in cases where WTO members have a common trade policy). Given that an 
objective of the proposed exercise is to focus on a broad set of policies that impact on international 
trade and investment (SCT) – i.e., to cut across the various silos and identify gaps/overlaps – this is 
best pursued through an inter-agency taskforce with involvement of WTO secretariat staff drawn from 
different divisions, including the economic research division, working with a sample of business and 
business associations that are willing to contribute to the exercise.  
There are many ways in which the WTO can do more to engage with business. The approach 
advocated above differs from many proposals to emulate what is done in other organizations to 
provide business with a voice, e.g., in the OECD, where business is represented by a Business and 
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Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC). This is unlikely to do much in terms of learning and mobilizing 
attention on SCT frictions because by construction such advisory bodies engage on specific policies. It 
is important that business be able to express a view on policy matters, and an advisory business 
council would be an improvement over the status quo. But what is envisaged here goes significantly 
beyond the policy-specific advisory and advocacy inputs that characterize the role of BIAC in the 
OECD. The premise of the supply chain-centered process is that WTO members would benefit from 
creating mechanisms to engage with business and generate “real-world” feedback and input that 
allows them to better understand how regulatory policies interact to affect trade and investment. 
3.2. Engaging with the PTAs: transparency and learning 
The proliferation of PTAs offers the WTO membership as a whole an opportunity to learn from the 
different approaches that are being pursued. PTAs are in some sense laboratories. The experiments 
that are successful in specific PTAs may be transferable. Over time WTO members may come to the 
view that some of the processes and approaches that have proved successful in a PTA context should 
be embedded into the WTO. A precondition for such learning is transparency: WTO members need to 
have information on what is being done in the PTA context. Rather than seek to determine this 
individually, this is much better done by an agency such as the WTO secretariat that provides the 
information to all WTO members. Ideally signatories to the PTAs would agree to provide information 
and share their experiences with implementation with the broader WTO membership. But independent 
of whatever PTAs members are willing to provide in this regard, the WTO secretariat should be 
mandated to analyze and report on the specific processes or approaches that have been implemented in 
PTAs and assessing their impacts on economic outcomes.  
An important contribution the WTO could make in this regard is to significantly expand what is 
done today by the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) and the Transparency Review 
Mechanism. Collecting and analyzing information on implementation of PTA disciplines would allow 
a much better understanding of what actually is being done in the PTA context, not just in terms of 
policy but in terms of institutional change and strengthening, specific types of cooperation and 
interactions between PTA members, and the investments that are undertaken as part of the 
implementation of PTA provisions. Current monitoring of PTAs by the secretariat focuses primarily 
on documenting the provisions of PTAs. This is not particularly informative for countries seeking to 
understand what is entailed in implementing those provisions and the outcomes that are generated. As 
in the previous proposal, bringing in and using firm and industry level data on variables of interest – 
such as trade costs, clearance times, etc.—would help WTO Members to better understand if and how 
PTA procedures and disciplines have an impact in improving economic outcomes and performance.  
3.3. PTAs and LDCs 
Special and differential treatment (SDT) is a core feature of the WTO, with the group of least-
developed countries singled out to receive the most far-reaching preferences that high-income 
countries are willing to provide. Opinions differ regarding the effectiveness of SDT but in principle 
preferential access to markets is of value to the countries to which it is granted. One consequence of 
PTA-based liberalization of trade between members is that any market access preferences granted to 
LDCs are eroded. Given that new vintage PTAs span commitments on policy areas that go beyond the 
WTO, this well-understood form of preference erosion may be made worse by additional 
discrimination against LDCs because benefits may not, and presumably will not, be extended to non-
members. The LDCs are not participants in the mega-regionals, both because most are very 
small/poor, and because they do not wish to participate.  
One straightforward way of reducing any discriminatory impacts would be for PTA members to 
extend the benefits of what is negotiated to the LDCs on an unconditional, non-reciprocal basis. This 
can be done for both goods and for services, given the 2011 decision by the WTO membership to 
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adopt a waiver for the MFN requirement that is contained in the GATS.
17
 In the case of services and 
regulatory provisions, simply extending PTA benefits to LDCs may not be very meaningful however, 
given prevailing capacity and institutional weaknesses. One way of addressing this constraint would 
be for members of mega-regionals and to put in place an aid for trade (AFT) mechanism to assist 
LDCs improve their standards, regulation, etc. to the level that is required to benefit from what is 
agreed.  
Such an initiative would help reduce the extent of any discrimination and could enhance the 
development dimension of the mega-regionals by targeting AFT in areas that would help bolster the 
capacity of firms and service providers from LDCs to benefit from PTA provisions. While it is 
desirable that LDCs be able to benefit from mega-regionals, it should be recognized that there are 
opportunity costs associated with allocating AFT to PTA-covered policy areas and pursuing whatever 
regulatory reform and upgrading that may be required – these may not be priorities for LDCs and it 
would be undesirable for scarce aid resources and personnel in LDCs to be allocated to non-priority 
areas. Although it is easy to call for PTA-associated AFT to be additional, in practice this is very 
difficult to ensure. Nonetheless, agreement that all benefits of the new vintage PTAs be extended to 
the LDCs would at least give these countries the opportunity to compete on a level playing field.  
3.4 Plurilateral cooperation and Annex IV WTO agreements
18 
The WTO offers two mechanisms for Members to form ‘clubs’ to move forward on an agenda of 
common interest without necessarily extending the benefits to other WTO members: negotiating a 
PTA that is justified under Art. XXIV GATT and/or Art. V GATS, or conclusion of a Plurilateral 
Agreement (PA) under Art. II.3 WTO. The latter provision permits sub-sets of the WTO Membership 
to agree to certain disciplines applying to signatories only. In contrast to a PTA, which must cover 
substantially all trade in goods (Art. XXIV GATT), and/or have substantial sectoral coverage of 
services (Art. V GATS), PAs can be issue- or policy-specific.  
Four PAs were incorporated into the WTO in 1995 as “Annex 4 agreements”: the International 
Dairy Agreement, the International Bovine Meat Agreement, the Agreement on Civil Aircraft and the 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009).
19
 The first two of 
these agreements were not incorporated into the WTO for pragmatic reasons and are no longer in force 
having been superseded by the Agreement on Agriculture.
20
 The GPA is a combination of market 
access commitments and rules in an area that was explicitly excluded from the coverage of the GATT 
and that continues to be excluded from the WTO. The Civil Aircraft agreement also has market access 
and rule-making elements, with the important difference that the liberalization commitments made by 
signatories apply on a MFN basis, in contrast to the GPA. Much of the Agreement on Civil Aircraft 
has been superseded by the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and the GPA 
(which includes rules on public purchases of civil aircraft).
21
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 The waiver permits WTO members to discriminate in favor of LDCs through granting preferential market access for 
services or in the application/enforcement of regulatory regimes. 
18
 This section draws on Hoekman and Mavroidis (2013) which undertakes a comprehensive comparison and assessment of 
the PA and PTA approaches to cooperation between subsets of WTO members. 
19
 Sometimes the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) is inaccurately depicted as a PA. It is not. It is a critical mass 
agreement that is implemented on a MFN basis through tariff commitments (bindings) of signatories. The same is true for 
other sectoral agreements for goods (e.g., so-called zero-for-zero agreements for certain chemicals, agricultural 
machinery, medical equipment, scientific equipment, and construction equipment) and services (e.g., the agreements on 
basic telecommunications and on financial services).  
20
 The dairy and bovine meat agreements were terminated by decisions of the General Council on 31 December 1997 and 
17 December 1997 respectively. 
21
 The genesis of the Civil Aircraft Agreement was an effort by the EU and the US to agree on more specific rules on 
permissible support for aircraft production and trade than those that applied under the GATT. Signatories to the Civil 
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The case for greater recourse to PAs as a way of allowing sub-sets of countries to move forward on 
an issue and permit progress to be made on rule-making under the umbrella of the WTO is not new – 
see e.g., Lawrence (2006) and Levy (2006). The argument has not had much traction because there is 
significant opposition to expanding the number of PAs in the WTO. For example, Brazil and India 
among others have opposed the idea of adopting an agreement on trade facilitation or on services on a 
plurilateral basis. This opposition contrasts with the general acceptance and pursuit of PTAs.  
PTAs and PAs both permit but do not require discrimination. Both liberalize trade and/or define 
rules of the game for a sub-set of the WTO Membership that shares similar views and wants to go 
beyond prevailing WTO disciplines. Recent vintage PTAs often deal with issues that are not covered 
by the WTO,
22
 while any PA must by definition go beyond existing WTO rules. While PTAs must 
have substantial coverage of the trade between the partners to be WTO-legal, PAs can be limited to 
just one policy area. Another major difference is that Art. X.9 of the WTO Agreement stipulates that 
the Ministerial Conference of the WTO may decide to add an agreement to the existing set of PAs 
listed in Annex 4 “exclusively by consensus.” In contrast, with the advent of the Transparency 
Mechanism in 2006, there is no longer any effort by WTO Members to approve new PTAs 
(Mavroidis, 2011). Consistency with the WTO is instead left to be determined through dispute 
settlement: if a WTO member believes a PTA is inconsistent with the WTO, it can bring a claim to 
that effect and ask for a Panel to rule on the matter. The fact that there are no provisions or criteria on 
what is (should be) permitted in terms of sectors or their content/coverage implies that there is great 
flexibility in principle for those aspiring to establish a PA, but that utilization of this flexibility is 
constrained by the need to obtain approval by all WTO Members to move forward, even if many or 
most do not intend to join. 
Another difference between the two instruments is that PTAs tend to be closed clubs – most PTAs 
do not include an accession clause. Those that do often limit this to countries that are geographically 
proximate. This helps explain the proliferation of PTAs – a new agreement tends to be negotiated 
between members of any given PTA and non-members. PAs in contrast are “open” – in principle no 
WTO member can be excluded from a PA once it has been negotiated and accepted as an Annex 4 
agreement. Thus, insofar as WTO members can satisfy whatever conditions apply for membership 
(i.e., conform to the disciplines that constitute the substantive provisions of the PA) they cannot be 
excluded. Indeed, a rationale for negotiating a PA in the first place is to encourage wider membership 
over time – that has certainly been the goal of the signatories of the GPA. 
Transparency of PAs is ensured through the process of notification to the General Council and the 
need for the Council to approve any PA that is brought forward. If approved, a PA will result in the 
establishment of the types of WTO bodies that assist Members in the implementation of agreements, 
such as a Committee, with regular (annual) reporting on activities to the Council, and documentation 
that is open to all WTO Members. Moreover, disputes under a PA must be submitted to WTO Panels 
(and eventually the Appellate Body). This ensures that case law regarding plurilaterals will develop 
harmoniously with case law regarding the multilateral WTO agreements. These are all arguably 
features of PAs that make them more attractive than PTAs from a trading system perspective. 
Objections raised against PAs include worries that they will focus on controversial issues such as 
labor standards; that PAs will erode MFN; that the rules that are negotiated will be precedent-setting; 
that asymmetric negotiating capacity will bias disciplines towards what powerful countries want; and 
that PAs will reduce the prospects for issue linkages needed to conclude deals policies that are 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Aircraft Agreement agreed to eliminate import duties on a specific list of civil aircraft-related products on a MFN basis 
(because the products involved are covered by the GATT). 
22
 Horn et al. (2010) distinguish between WTO+ and WTO-X obligations in PTAs: the former cover matters that are fall 
under the current mandate of the WTO but where commitments in the PTA-context are more comprehensive (e.g., deeper 
than MFN tariff cuts); the latter refer to policy areas currently not addressed by the WTO (e.g., cooperation on macro-
economic policies). 
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supported by strong vested interests. The salience of many of these concerns depends on the substance 
and coverage of a PA. If the PA is WTO-X (that is, deals with a new issue—say an agreement on 
certain climate change-related policies), it may be precedent-setting but there is no issue of 
fragmentation or undercutting MFN as this currently does not apply. This is not the case for so-called 
WTO+ PAs – i.e., agreements that deepen existing rules. WTO+ agreements that involve 
discriminatory market access concessions are likely to be problematical from a trading system 
perspective as they presumably imply targeted, narrow discrimination of the type that the WTO rules 
on PTAs were intended to prevent. WTO+ PAs that involve regulatory commitments and cooperation 
may be discriminatory in effect but this is more likely to be a side effect of whatever is jointly 
implemented—e.g., mutual recognition of regulatory standards and practices.23 This suggests that if a 
PA involves a set of common rules and aims at regulatory cooperation/convergence for a policy area 
that is not covered by the WTO, there is less cause for concern about potential detrimental 
consequences for the trading system. Greater willingness to accept such PAs might on the margin 
result in fewer new PTAs and facilitate a process through which specific dimensions of PTAs dealing 
with regulatory policies could be incorporated in the WTO and gradually be multilateralized over 
time.  
A constraint in pursuing the plurilateral route is that the incorporation of a PA into the WTO 
requires unanimity (“exclusively by consensus”). Greater use of PAs arguably will require a relaxation 
of this rule (Tijmes-Lhl, 2010). While presumably intended to ensure that any PA is consistent with 
multilateralism, consensus is arguably too strong a constraint. A rationale for the consensus rule may 
have been concern about countries putting forward subject areas simply because of the DSU or for 
‘strategic’ reasons – e.g., controversial issues like labor standards. However, consensus is not needed 
to provide assurances that efforts to introduce PAs on controversial matters that are only weakly trade 
related can be blocked. Relaxing the consensus requirement – for example through agreement that 
“substantial coverage” of world trade or production is sufficient (Hufbauer and Schott, 2012)24 or 
acceptance that a two-thirds majority suffices – would still ensure that controversial issues can be 
rejected while removing the ability of a limited number of countries to block a PA that the majority of 
the WTO Membership finds acceptable. The Enhanced Cooperation Agreements that are foreseen in 
the EU context to permit a subset of EU members to move forward in a policy area only require 
participation by 9 out of 27 member states in instances where consensus cannot be obtained (Hoekman 
and Mavroidis, 2013).  
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 An example would be a PA on trade facilitation that involves signatories committing to specific actions that ensures 
reciprocal “green channel” treatment for goods (such as risk assessment practices, collection and sharing of data on 
consignments). This implies better market access conditions for signatories of the PA, but this is conditional on a having 
put in place an agreed set of procedures, having made the necessary policy reforms and investments, etc. As non-
members satisfy the preconditions for establishing the capacity to implement the specific commitments required for club 
membership they should be able to participate and benefit from the provisions of the PA. 
24
 They suggest a minimum coverage of 40 percent of world trade as opposed to the norm of 90 percent that empirically has 
defined the feasibility of critical mass agreements in the GATT/WTO. 
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3. Concluding Remarks 
Two developments have played an important role in inducing major trading nations – in particular the 
US – to shift to a PTA-centered trade strategy: the rapid rise of BCI, especially China, and the 
increasing complexity of the policy agenda affecting international production networks and supply 
chain trade. The changes that have occurred in the structure of the world economy as a result of both 
policy reforms and technological advances—reflected in production fragmentation and geographic 
splintering of value chains—have increased incentives for countries to lower trade costs and levels of 
import protection (Gawande, Hoekman, and Cui, 2013). But, as has been observed by many analysts, 
another result of the increase in cross-border investment and fragmentation of global production is that 
many more policy areas become a source of potential spillovers. Many of the relevant policy areas – 
including investment, subsidies, environment, procurement, data protection and privacy policies were 
not on the table in the DDA.  
Time will tell whether the mega-regional agreements that are under negotiation at the time of 
writing will make substantial progress in crafting disciplines in such areas. We have yet to see any 
major developing country (BCI) conclude a deep PTA with another large nation, developed or 
developing. This situation may change, but the fact that the large emerging economies have not been 
active (or successful) in negotiating deep PTAs with each other or with the large OECD nations 
suggests that the WTO will remain an important vehicle to engage on and address trade issues. The 
lack of progress in the DDA should not be taken to imply a lack of relevance of the WTO. Multilateral 
negotiations have become more complex because developing countries have interests that are pursuing 
and objectives they want to achieve. PTAs may well be more effective mechanisms to address certain 
policy matters, especially of a regulatory nature or involving the liberalization of politically sensitive 
areas such as the movement of people. But to date they have not addressed subjects that feature 
prominently on the DDA agenda, e.g., agricultural policies, and that are important to BCI and other 
developing countries.  
As argued by Wolfe (2013) among others, at the end of the day it is likely that BCI and the US, EU 
and Japan will come back to the multilateral negotiating table simply because BCI are not part of the 
mega-regional initiatives. Thus, eventually the majors are likely to re-initiate efforts to address policy 
spillovers and engage in rule-making in the WTO context. Much can be done in the interim to use the 
WTO to better understand the effects of regulatory policies on trade and investment, to learn about 
what is done in the PTAs and whether this is worth emulating, and more generally to engage more on 
regulatory policy spillovers in the WTO. The proposals sketched out in this paper would support such 
processes. A key feature of the proposal is to shift the balance of WTO activities a bit more towards 
substantive engagement with the business community – arguably a core constituency of the 
organization – so as to focus more on the effects of policies in generating supply chain trade frictions, 
whether these are covered by the WTO or not .  
Insofar as the new vintage PTAs generate innovative approaches to deal the market segmenting 
effects of (differences in) regulatory policies, they can help all countries identify approaches that can 
usefully be emulated. All WTO members have a strong interest in understanding what these PTAs end 
up doing/achieving. Using the WTO infrastructure to document, analyze and assess the approaches 
that are implemented by PTAs to reduce barriers would help ensure both transparency and potentially 
inform a process of learning about what works and what does not, and identify specific features of 
cooperation in PTAs that can and should be multilateralized. Plurilateral agreements offer a vehicle for 
gradual multilateralization given the likelihood that many WTO members will not be ready to adopt 
the disciplines and mechanisms in question at any given point in time. They allow for gradual 
expansion of membership as countries deem that it is in their interest to participate.  
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